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One of the goals of the Jfealthy People 2010 initiative,
advanced by the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services is to "[r]educe the number of people
with disabilities in congregate care facilities" to
zero by the year 2010.1 According to the American
Academy of Pediatrics Committee Section on
Children with Disabilities, "[m]ost parents desire to
raise their children with special health care needs at
home."2 However. caring flor a child with prolound
developmental disabilities can be particularly difficult
as the child matures into adulthood. A child's continued
physical growth may impose significant limitations on
a parent's ability to care for the child.
As a result some doctors have proposed a controversial
method of"treatment," designed to mitigate particular
challenges that caregivers face due to the continued
growth of a child with severe disabilities. This
treatment. termed "growth-attenuation therapy"
consists of using treatments of high-dose estrogen
at an early age in order to stimulate growth of the
epiphyseal growth plates, which in turn permanently
attenuates physical size. '"[A]chieving permanent
growth attenuation while the child is still young and
of manageable size would remove one of the major
obstacles to family care and might extend the time that
parents with the ability, resources, and inclination to
care for their child at home might be able to do so."4
Not surprisingly, this controversial method of
intervention has caused considerable debate both in the
United States and abroad. Ashley, a nine-year-old girl
with severe cognitive and developmental disabilities
is at the center of this controversy. At the request of
Ashley's parents, doctors have attenuated Ashley's
growth., and performed other procedures, believing
that such measures will provide a better "adult quality
of life" for their daughter.
'This article explores the legal and ethical implications
of Ashley's "treatment." Although there is no explicit
legal prohibition on growth attenuation, the fact
that doctors are capable of performing a particular
intersvention does not neccssarily mean thcy should.
T-his article juxtaposes the moral question at issue with
an analysis of the legal rights available to the parents
and child, respectively.
Ashley is a nine-year-old girl who was born with static
encephalopathy, a medical condition resulting in severe
developmental and cognitive deficiencies.' Ashley
requires assistance moving her body, is fed through
a gastronomy tube., and her mental development has
remained and will likely continue to remain that of an
infant. Her parents call her their "Pillow Angel, since
she is so sweet and stays right where ItheyI place her
- usually on a pillow."
When Ashle was six-years-old, she started showing
signs of puberty.1o Ashley was growing quickly and
had already started developing breasts." Ashley's
early pubertal development prompted fear in her
parents: Ashley's continued growth eventually would
make it untenable for them to care for their daughter at
home, despite their strong desire to do so." Ashley's
parents expressed concern over one day having to
place her "in the hands of strangers." They were also
concerned with the potential complications of puberty,
including what would happen if their daughter started
menstruating.14
To "significantly elevate Ashley's adult quality of life,"
her parents and doctors developed a plan for Ashley
involving growth attenuation, a hysterectomy, and
breast bud removal." The parents teried this collective
set of medical procedures, "Ashley's Treatment."11
T-he purpose of the hysterectomy was to "prevent
the discomfort, pain, cramps and bleeding that are
so commonly associated with the menstrual cycle."7
Ashley's parents noted that additional benefits included
'avoiding the possibility of pregnancy" in case Ashley
is abused, eliminating the risk of uterine cancer," and
further claimed that she "has no need [for her uterus] ...
since she will not be bearing children."'" Although
doctors removed Ashley's uterus, they did not remove
her oxvaries in order to ensure that she xxill maintain
"her hormonal cy cle anid the generatton of her natural
hormones" 20 "T his onetime [sic] procedure eliminates
the complications ot menses." sparing \shley and her
parents "the expense. pain, and inconxvenience of a
lifetime of hormone injections."2
Ashley 's parents basedtheirdecision torenmoxveAsh ley's
breast buds on family history since large breasts
run in Ashley's mother's tamily.22 Ashley's parents
contend that large breasts would be uncomfortable for
Ashley., and may impede their ability to safely secure
Ashley in her wheelchair.2 Incidental benefits include
eliminating the risk of breast cancer and fibrocystic
growths, both of which also run in Ashley's family.24
Ashley's parents were further concerned that large
breasts might "sexualize" her towards her potential
caregivers, especially if touched accidentally during
Ashley's care.
The onset of puberty typically causes a child to grow
significantly. Doctors have found that premature
exposure to sex steroids, such as estrogen, can stunt
final adult height by inducing the quick maturation of
growth plates.25 The earlier a child is exposed to such
steroids, the more significant the growth attenuation
will be.26 Since Ashley first underwent such treatment
when she was merely six-years-old, her height will
likely never exceed four feet, five inches, and her
weight will remain approximately 75 pounds."
This is not the first time such treatment has been used
to stunt a child's growth. Ihe first reported use of
high-dose estrogen as a means to attenuate growth was
reported in 1956.28 Such treatment was often used on
girls who were considered "too tall" before reaching
puberty to minimize additional growth." While doctors
still use growth attenuation as a treatment option
today, it is far less common, as the stigma previously
associated with women of tall stature has decreased
significantly."
Potential side effects of the treatment are somewhat
uncertain since doctors have limited experience with
the use of growth attenuation in young children.
Doctors believe the side effects associated with this
treatment may be significant, causing early onset
of breast development and uterine bleeding. The
potential for these side effects to develop in the future
contributed to the rationale for removing Ashley's
uterus and breast buds.
Couits generally afford substantial deference to parents
making "important decisions tor their children.
State and federal lass grants paients decision-making
authorits swith regard to choices insvolsving children's
health care.34 While there is a presumption in fav or of
a parent's autonomy over health care decisions, courts
may osverrule a parent's vsishes in certain circumstances.
When a parent chooses to wxithhold certain treatment
for reasons unrelated to the well-being of the child,
for example, a court may order treatment for the child
if it is not highly invasive and if it is likely to have
significant health benefits.3 'Where the treatment's
success is lower or substantially uncertain, courts
may be less likely to overrule the parents' or child's
wishes."'
Some states, such as Washington, where Ashley and
her family currently reside, require court approval
of certain health care decisions before they are
performed.37 These health care decisions include those
that are "highly invasive and irreversible," such as
involuntary sterilization."
Washington law is clear about involuntary sterilization.
In In re Gumardianshf[ of Hayes, the Washington
Supreme Court considered whether a mother could
consent to the sterilization of her child who had
severe mental retardation." Ihe court held that "in
any proceedings to determine whether an order for
sterilization should issue. the retarded person must be
represented, as here, by a disinterested guardian ad
litem."41 The court found that a guardian is necessary
in such cases because "unlike the situation of a normal
and necessary medical procedure, in the question of
sterilization the interests of the parents of a retarded
person cannot be presumed to be identical to those
of the child."i Thus, "[t]here is a heavy presumption
against sterilization of an individual incapable of
informed consent...It]his burden will be even harder
to overcome in the case of a minor incompetent."42
Ashley's hysterectomy rendered her sterile. Because
her parents did not seek a court order or request the
appointment of a guardian ad liten before consenting
to the hysterectomy, the Washington Protection and
Advocacy System found that this aspect of "Ashley's
TFreatment" v iolated both the United States C onstitution
and Washington state law.4 3 Whether other procedures
associated with "Ashlev's Treatment," also violated
Washington law remains unclear. The Washington
Protection and Advocacy System argues that the
removal of Ashley's breast buds, the hormone therapy,
and the other procedures associated with Ashley's
treatment also violate her constitutional rights because
they are "highly invasive and irreversible, particularly
w5hen implemented together.4
Interestingly, all argumnents supporting and opposing
Ashley 's treatment, includine of the Washington
Protection and Adsvocacy Sy stemn, seem to assumne that
the array of procedures actually constitutes medical
"treatment" protected by constitutional and common
lass IThe American Association on Intellectual and
Developmietadl~isabilities (A AIDDI poinsoutthatthe
doctors exploring grovsth attenuation as a tieatment for
children with Ashley's condition "seemed to implicitly
accept the idea that growth attenuation is in fact a
type of therapy ... Given that therapy is intended to
address a condition of a patient, the target in this case
would have to be the growth and maturation expected
as a consequence of Ashley's normal development."4 5
Apreliminary review of the case law reveals no judicial
definitions of "medical treatment." Courts frequently
pass judgment on the appropriateness of parents'
medical treatment decisions on behalf of their children,
particularly when such decisions are not religiously
motivated. For example, in In re Cicero, the Supreme
Court of New York considered whether to appoint a
guardian for an infant born with spina bifida because
the infant's parents refused to consent to surgery to
help repair the infant's condition.41 f treated, the
court found that the infant's "extremity deficits will,
hopefully, be only at the leg level below the ankles.
Additionally, she will lack sphincter control of the
bladder and anus, but modern medicine and surgery
can ameliorate these conditions too. She should be
able to walk with short leg braces and hopefully have a
'normal' intellectual development."'4
The court granted the appointment of a guardian,
reasoning:
This is not a case where the court is asked to
preserve an existence which cannot be a life.
What is asked is that a child bom with handicaps
be given a reasonable opportunity to live, to grow
and hopefully to surmount those handicaps. It the
power to make that choice is vested in the court.,
there can be no doubt as to what the choice must
be."i The court distinguished between "hopeless"
lives and the case at bar, without defining what a
"hopeless" life entailed. The court continued:
There is a hint in this proceeding of a philosophy
that newborn, 'hopeless' lives should be permitted
to expire without an effort to save those lives.
Fortunately, the medical evidence here is such that
we do not confront a 'hopeless' life. As Justice
Asch has pointed out [citation omitted]I '(t)here
is a strident cry in America to terminate the lives
of other people-deemed physically or mentally
defective.'
This court was not constituted to heed that crx. Rather.
to paraphrase Justice Asch [ citation omitted] it is our
function to secure to each his opportunity for 'life,
liberty and the pursuit of happiness.' 49
A case before the Supreme Court of Massachusetts.,
however, provides an example of a "hopeless life"
In In re Custody o; M V inor, the court affirmed a no
code" order for a four-and-one-half-month-old infant
suffering from cyanotic heart disease, a condition
without a cure, which would cause fatal complications
for the infant within a year regardless of whether the
hospital administered treatment. IThe court reasoned
that "[a] 'full code' order would involve a substantial
degree of bodily invasion accompanied by discomfort
and pain, and would do nothing but prolong the child's
'agony and suffering."'
In deciding whether to intervene with parents' medical
decisions on behalf of their children, courts seem to
draw the line at whether a child's situation is hopeless
and death is imminent regardless of treatment, or
whether treatment might help the child. In Ashley's
case, her condition does not pose an imminent threat
to her health. Therefore one must question whether
measures taken allegedly to improve Ashley's quality
of life should also be subject to judicial intervention.
IThe Access to Medical ITreatment Act, a recently
proposed bill, would "permit an individual to be
treated by a health care practitioner with any method
of medical treatment such individual requests, and tor
other purposes."" While it is unclear whether the bill
addresses treatment tor children xxhose parents request
medical treatment on their behalf, it defines "medical
treatment" as "any food, drug, dcevice, or proccdure that
is used and intended as a cure, mitigation, treatmxent, or
prexvention of diseasc or a health condition.""S
In Ashley 's case, the treatment iregimen xxill not cure
her undcrly ing condition. Whether Ashley 's tull-
tcrm groxxth xxould constitutc a "disease" or "health
condition' is also uncar. Ashlexy's trcatmcnt may
miigate her condition in the sense of making her more
comfortable. For example, Ashley's doctors argue that
"[a] child who is easier to move will in all likelihood
be moved more frequently. Being easier to move
means more stimulation, fewer medical complications, and more social
interactions." 56
Courts also consider the mental capacity of the child when evaluating a
parent's medical treatment decision. For example, in the case of the child
with spina bifida, the court carefully pointed out that the child would likely
have "normal" intellectual development. While Ashley's condition does
not pose an imminent threat to her health, her mental development will not
be "normal." One should consider how, if at all, Ashley's mental capacity
should influence a court's decision as to whether to allow her parents'
proposed treatment.
Courts may use nental capacity as criteria in assessing whether certain
medical decisions are appropriate. For example, courts have allowed
caregivers to terminate a child's life in cases where the child has minimal
brain function, such as a child in a persistent vegetative state.5 T herefore,
it becomes important to determine where courts "draxw the line" regarding
the appropriateness of certain medical procedures given the mental capacity
of the patient.
In balancing whether to approve a medical procedure for a minor, a court
may also look at the minor's health care wishes. In Ashley's case, however,
her wishes are not ascertainable due to her cognitive disabilities. ITherefore.
her parents will be responsible for making all of her health care decisions.
Where a parent makes a health care decision for a child whose health care
wishes are not ascertainable, the court may use one of two standards to
determine whether the parents' wishes should be upheld. These standards
are: (1) the "substituted judgment" standard,; and (2) the "best interest"
standard. For example, the law allows parents of a patient in a persistent
vegetative state, or of an anencephalic child, to make decisions regarding
treatment options. In the case of a patient in a persistent vegetative state,
the laxx allows the patient's proxy to make choices for the patient, based
on what the patient likely would have wanted. Ihis type of proxy decision
making is called "substituted judgment."" In the case of an anencephalic
child whose wishes could not be known, the laxw allows the proxy to make
decisions based on the best interests of the patient.60
Courts have applied the substituted judgment standard in cases involving
patients with profound mental retardation. In Superinten/ent ofBelchertown
State School v. Saikevicz, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts applied
the substituted judgment standard in affirming the lower court's decision
to withhold chemotherapy for Mr. Saikewicz, a 67-year-old man with
profound mental retardation."6 Though today such a measurement is
considered somexxhat misleading,6 " the eour't found that the 67-xyear-old
man had "a mental age of approximately txxo xyears and eight months," and
an 'I.Q. of ten."6
In applying the substituted judgment standaid, the court looked at "the
decision, .x..xhich would be made by the incompetent person, if that per son
xxas competent . .. "" In particular, the court considered several factors
faxvoring the administration of chemotheiapy, including' (1) the fact that,
if gixven a choice, most people xvould likely elect to haxve chemotherapy
in this situation, and (2) the possibility that such treatment wxould prolong
Saikexxicz's life.65 The court assumed that since this treatmnent is xxhat
"most people" would have wanted, it must be what Saikeewicz likely would
have wanted had he been competent to make such a decision
The court found six factors opposing the administration of chemotherapy,
including: (1) Saikewicz's advanced age; (2) the possible side effects of the
chemotherapy; (3) the fact that the chemotherapy would not likely cause
the leukemia to go into remission: (4) the fact that the chemotherapy would
cause suffering; (5) Saikewicz's inability to cooperate with the treatment.
given his insufficient comprehension, and (6) Saikewicz's potentially
diminished quality of life even if the chemotherapy did work.66 Since the
factors opposing the treatment outweighed those supporting it, the court
ruled to withhold the treatment.
If a court were to examine Ashlev's treatment under the substituted
judgment standard,. it would likely not find such treatment options
preferable. Since Ashley has never been competent, a court applying the
Saikewicz substituted judgment standard would evaluate whether Ashley
would want such medical procedures if she had been competent. A six-
year-old girl would most likely not want to have a hysterectomy, breast
bud removal, or hormone therapy to keep her small. Ashley's case differs
from Saikewicz's in that her treatment serves to prevent the occurrence
of certain life stages because Ashley has mental disabilities, whereas the
purpose of Saikewicz's treatment xwas intended to combat his leukemia.
Ashley's parents might argue that she would prefer such treatment if it
enabled her to remain a part of her family. IHer parents would want a court
to apply the substituted judgment analysis by asking not what a competent
Ashley would choose in this situation, but rather, what a competent Ashley
would choose if she knew she was going to be incomopetent.
Ashley's parents would likely fare better in a court that applied a best interest
analysis. In a best interest analysis, "[tihe decision is not based on the
surrogate's view ot quality of life, but 'the value that the continuation of life
has fom the patient . . .' not
'the value that others find
in the continuation of the
patient's life . . . .'6 In
making such a decision,
the court must exaluate
objectixve, societally
shared criteria. Ihe best
interests standard rests
on the protection ot
patmimnts' xxclfare rather
than on the value ot
self-determination. "In
assessimig xxhethera
proeedure or course of
treatment xxould be in a
patient's best interests, the surrogate must take into account factors such as the
relief of suffering . . .and the quality as xvell as the extent of life sustained."oI
Potential benefits to Ashley may inelude greater stimulation, more social
interactions xxith family amid friends, and fewver medical eomplications from
puberty.,' Another potential benefit xxould be that "groxxth attenuation may
offer some parents at least the opportunity to extend the tinme they ean eare
for their ehild at home, xxhereas otherxxise institutionalization, or foster
care, might be the only altemative."" Ashley's parents argue that these
benefits serve to alleviate Ashley's suffering and inprove her quality of
life, both of which satisfy the criteria under a best interest analysis.
Ashley's parents' argument, however, involves several
assumptions. Notably, they assume that home care is
objectively better than care provided at a specialized
institution. They also assume that they are, in fact,
correct in their predicted inability to care for Ashley
in their home if she were permitted to grow to her
natural size without growth attenuation treatment.
Such assumptions need to be evaluated on a case-by-
case basis.
As for the relief of suffering, the treatment is not
without potential side effects. One possible risk of the
treatment is thrombosis, a potentially fatal formation
of a blood clot in an artery or vein. Furthermore,
Ashley's doctors may not have considered the potential
emotional effects that stunted growth, hysterectomy,
or breast bud removal could have on Ashley. Quite
possibly, such procedures could have a profound effect
on Ashley. While her doctors assert that "it is unlikely
that such 'infantilization' harms a person whose
mental capacity will always remain that of a young
child."?2 children. even those with severe mental
disabilities, may still react to environmental stimuli.
Despite her mental incapacity, Ashlev may find the
surgery, therapy, or side effects both physically and
emotionally painful.
Ashley's doctors apparently evaluated the benefits
and risks of Ashley's treatment based upon how they
perceive Ashley would fit into traditional society. They
argue:
Ileight and normal stature clearly have social
value for most individuals. Being taller has been
associated with enhanced social stature, greater
pay greater success in attracting a mate, and other
social benefits. However, anonambulatory, severely
impaired child is not someone who will experience
these benefits of tall stature and therefore will not
suffer their loss if kept short. For an individual who
will never be capable of holding ajob, establishing
a romantic relationship, or interacting as an adult,
it is hard to imagine how beino smaller would be
socially disadxvantageous.7
In fact, thc doctors assert that it might be adxvantagcous
for Ashlcy to look young and renmain small bccausc
"for a pcrson xxith a dcxvelopmntal age of an infant,
smaller stature may actually constitute an adxvantage
because others probably xxould be more likely to
interact in xxay s that are nmore appropriate to that
person's developmental age."74
One could argue that Ashley 's doctors' reasoning
is right-that allowing Ashley to grow "naturally"
is really not "natural" for her at all. Generally, it is
presumed that physical development will be concurrent
with mental development, and thus expected that a
person with the "mental capacity" of a six year old will
look like a six year old. Therefore, one might justify
Ashley's growth attenuation treatment by arguing that
it would be unnatural for Ashley to develop to her
expected normal size because her mental capacity will
never be that of an adult.
Were it the accepted norm for individuals' physical
sizes to be altered to more accurately comport with
their intellectual capacity, society would need to
determine where to draw the line. For example, society
might find it more justifiable to stunt the growth of a
child whose mental capacity will remain similar to
an infant's. Society may find it less palatable to stunt
the growth of a child whose mental capacity will not
exceed that of a twelve year old, since many would
perceive this child as having a more fulfilling quality
of life. At precisely what level of mental development
it would be appropriate to attenuate growth as opposed
to allowing flull physical development to occur
naturally remains unclear. It Ashley's parents and
doctors are able to justify keeping her small based
upon her mental capacity it may open the door for
abuse of other individuals with varying degrees of
mental retardation.
Overall, a court would likely need to conduct a
balancing test in order to weigh the potential harms and
benefits ofAshley's treatment. In In re Phillip B., the
California Appellate Court proposed such a balancing
test in considering whether the trial court erroneously
denied a petition requesting that a child with Down
syndrome be considered a dependent child because the
child's parents refused to consent to heart surgery that
would prolong the child's life. T I he parents refused
to consent to the surgery because they thought that
it "would be merely life-prolonging rather than life-
saving, presenting the possibility that they would be
unable to care for [their childi during his later years."17
The parents clearly based their decision on their son's
mental retardation, as the father testified that he would
haxve consented to the surgemy if it had been required
for his othcr sons, all of wxhom did not hayve intellcectual
disabilities."
IThe court afflirmed the trial court's decision and
found that thc statc did not mcct the burdcn of proof
necessary to intcirvene in the parents' medical decision.
The couirt hcld:
Several tfactur musLLt be taken into cosider ationu
betore a state insists upon medical tieatment
rejected by the parents. The state should examine
the seriousness of the harm the child is suffering
or the substantial likelihood that he will suffer
serious harm; the evaluation for the treatment
by the medical profession: the risks involved in
medically treating the child; and the expressed
preferences of the child."
In re Guardianship of Phillip addressed a situation
where the parents re/used to consent to medical
treatment and the state intervened. In Ashley's case,
her parents are attempting to proceed with a proposed
treatment, and if the state became involved, the state
would most likely try to intervene in order to prevent
her parents from proceeding with the treatment. A
court would still likely conduct a balancing test to
ensure that the treatment is in the child's best interest.
In a case like Ashley's, it would be difficult for a court
to balance the potential harms and benefits because
there is a great deal of uncertainty. For example, it
is possible that Ashley's doctors are incorrect about
her social and physical potential. Given that little is
known about the potential mental abilities of those
with profound mental retardation, it is entirely possible
that Ashley actually has or will have more advanced
mental capacities than initially predicted and there is
simply a disconnect between her mental capabilities
and her ability to express them.
Where there is so much uncertainty, a court may
choose to err on the side of caution. For example.,
even though .Ashley may receive benefits from her
proposed course of treatment, a court may nonetheless
find that the parents should choose the least drastic
alternatives possible. If they had chosen less invasive
or reversible alternatives instead of the performed
invasive and irreversible procedures and sought the
court's permission, Ashley's parents likely would
have been allowed to proceed with their treatment
with the court's authorization. By following this
course of action, the parents would hacve eliminated
all questions as to whether the family had potentially
violated Washington state law for failing to obtain a
court order.
The moral implications of alloxing Ashley to
endure this course of treatment, particularly ini light
of the bioethical principles of respect for persons,
nonmaleficence, and beneficence, must be considered.
Lasxs olten reflect sxhat a society deems as moral and
imrnoiral.bossevei the manifestation ofmoral principles
in lasw otten lags behind society's general acceptance
ot those same moral principles. In this straightforwxard
icgard, lass is a product of the govecrnmcnt's decision
to impose moral dutics on its citizens.
what happens to their own bodies, and that society
should respect these decisions. In an influential
report published by the National Commission for
the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical
and Behavioral Research. the Commission described
"respect for persons" as follows:
Respect for persons incorporates at least two
ethical convictions: first, that individuals should
be treated as autonomous agents, and second, that
persons with diminished autonomy are entitled to
protection. The principle of respect for persons
thus divides into two separate moral requirements:
the requirement to acknowledge autonomy and
the requirement to protect those with diminished
autonomny.79
Therefore, in evaluating Ashley's treatment from a-
respect-for-persons perspective, whether the treatment
serves to acknowledge and protect Ashley's autonomy
must be examined.
Those persons in support of Ashley's treatment may
argue that the treatment improves her quality of life
by allowing her to be as independent and comfortable
as physically possible, and thus acknowledges her
autonomy. The lack of menses means one less bodily
function that a caregiver must address, meaning less
interference for Ashley. The lack of developing breasts
may afford Ashley greater comfortwhile she lies down,
sits in her chair, or plays. Without intervention, Ashley
likely would have developed large breasts, given her
family history, which could have seriously impeded
her ability to move as she wished.so
In addition to autonomy, the concept of "dignity" is
another moral gauge by which Ashley's treatment
should be evaluated. Dignity may be considered in one
of two ways: as an inherent quality humans possess
(i.e., humans are "dignified"); or as asway of describing
how we treat others (i.e., we must treat others "with
dignity"). Both supporters and critics of Ashley's
parents' decision discuss "dignity" in the context of
wvhether thc treatmenlt wvill either dcprivec or rcstore
The principle of respect for persons emphasizes that
individuals have the right to make decisions about
Ashley"'s dignity. While Ashley's parents claim that
she "wiII retain more dignity in a bodx that is healthier,
more of a comfort to her, and more suited to her state
of development,"" critics argue that the treatment
violates Ashley 's dignity.
Peter Singer., a bioethicist at Princeton University,
however, views the concept of dignity somewhat
differently.ie claims that the concept of human
dignity is fundamentally flawed, and, therefore, does
not think that Ashley's treatment should be judged
solely by whether it violates her dignity. Singer
argues that, while personal dignity is certainly possible,
it requires that the subject have a cognitive awareness
of dignity." Because Ashley does not possess the level
of self-awareness necessary to understand the concept
of dignity, Singer argues that Ashley should be valued
by what she brings to her family. rather than merely
valued because she is a human being.8 1n other words,
Ashley's value should be measured not by her nature
as a living person, but, by what she means to others.
Therefore, Singer would likely analyze the question
of whether the treatment respects Ashley as a person
by not only assessing the ways in which it improves
Ashley's quality of life, but also by analyzing how the
results of the treatment would improve the lives of her
family members.
If Singer's appraisal of personal dignity is correct,
then his theory raises several claims that are contrary
to sound public policy. For example, under Singer's
logic, those who do not want to care for a family
member with a seriously diminished mental capacity
would be justified in terminating that family member's
life, because the family member has little value to the
family and little worth to society as an individual. This
unseemly proposition would likely horrify much of
society.
Even if one does not extend Singer's line of reasoning
to such an extreme level, under his theory, a family is
left with virtually unfettered authority regarding the life
of a family member with diminished mental capacity.
T his hypothesis alloxxs the family to consider its oxxn
interests in addition to those of the family menmber.
For exanmple, Singer's argument xwould alloxx Ashley's
parents to consider their oxvn eoinvenienee in deciding
wxhat course of tieatment to lake foi Ashley. If Ashley
is xaluable only insofar as she improxes the lite ot her
tamily, then based on this piemise, the tamily could
detennine xxhich medical intcrxventions to order for
Ashlex based. in part, on their contemplation of hoxx
the adj ustments xxould make her ecare more coaxvenient.
Again, such unfettered decision-making authority is
inconsistent with public policy
In addition to autonomy, one can morally gauge an
individual's conduct using the principles of non-
maleficence and beneficence. Nonmaleficence is the
duty not to inflict harm, or risk harm to others, and
is typically associated with the IHlippocratic Oath that
doctors take. Beneficence is the duty to help others by
acting in their interest. Ashley's parents and doctors
express the belief that they are helping Ashley with the
treatment, rather than harming her. There is no direct
correlation, however, between the course of treatment
and the intended cure. Instead, the benefits of this
treatment are more indirect and circuitous. As such,
society must consider whether "medical and surgical
interventions with significant risk to the individual
with intellectual disabilities, [can] ever be justified
by indirect benefits to the individual when most [of
the] direct benefits accrue to other caregivers such as
family members.""
Ifthe answer is yes and the benefits to other caregivers
are deemed adequate justification for procedures
that provide limited benefits to the patient, there is a
risk that this validation may open a Pandora's Box
to unanticipated and undesirable rainifications. Dick
Sobsey, the director of a health ethics center at the
Universitv ofAlberta, Canada, provides this illustrative
comparison of ways in which the indirect-benefit
rationale can run afoul: in some countries, families will
request that physicians amputate or medically mutilate
a child with a disability in order to make the child a
more productive beggar." While this image may be
repulsive, the justifications underlying the decision are
not that dissimilar to those being advanced by Ashley's
family. Caring for a child with a disability can be
costly, and a poor family may not have the resources to
care for the child at home, despite the family's desire
to do so. If the child can beg more productively as a
result of his or her exaggerated condition, the family
will, in turn, have greater resources to devote to caring
for the child.7 Alternatively, if a child is not able to
leave the home to earn money in this manner, then
the family max be forced to leave the child at home,
possibly tethered to a piece of turniture to ensure that
the child xxill refrain trom hurting himselt or others in
their absence."
Ashley 's case is analogous to the beggar's case in the
sense that the parents in both situations xxould choose
a procedure to alter xxhat xxould otherxise inaturally
occur foi the child. IFurther, in both cases, the parents'
dcciswi alsu enaobles the famuily tu provide impoved
care for the child and ensure that the child xwill be
able to remain with the tamily. In Ashley's case, her
parents argue that the results of the treatment will
make it easier for the family to care for her at home,
allowing Ashley the opportunity to be more involved in family events. In
the beggar's case, the parents' supplemented income allows them to afford
better medical treatment for the child, and remain with the child during the
day while he joins them in begging.
There are also significant differences between Ashley's circumstances
and the beggar's case. For example, in the case of the beggars' child, the
surgery will dramatically change the child's appearance. In Ashley's case,
the sugery will actually prevent Ashley's appearance from changing and
will ensure that she looks like a six-year-old for the remainder of her life.
Furthermore, assuming that the benefits Ashley's parents propose are
realized bx the treatment, there seems to be a greater correlation between
Ashley's procedures and her condition, as opposed to the less apparent link
between beggars' child's surgery and his condition. Ashley will arguably
obtain some direct benefits from her surgery as she will avoid the discomfort
and potential emotional trauma of puberty and may be more physically
comfortable with her smaller stature. 'The beggars' child, however, does not
obtain any direct benefit from his surgery. 'The benefit to the child would
be extremely indirect - the surgery may make the child a more productive
beggar, allowing the parents to obtain greater income as a result of the
child's condition and subsequently use the money to finance the child's
care. In this instance, the amputation itself will not directly alleviate any
problems associated with the child's condition.
AAIDD identifies other negative consequences associated with the slippery
slope of allowing growth attenuation:
With a damning combination of uncertain benefits and unknown
risks, growth attenuation as described by Gunther and Diekema is bad
medicine, but this practice has even more troubling implications. By
extension, if weight ever becomes a difficulty due to age-associated
loss of strength for the parents (rather than obesity of the child), then
the rationale would suggest that bariatric surgery or severe restriction
in caloric intake would be a form of therapy. If that proves insufficient,
the goal of reducing the size of the child could be addressed by
'amputation-therapy,' justified by the fact that the patient would never
be ambulatory in any event.S'
Essentially, AAIDD questions where the line should be draxwn vwith respect
to such therapies. Ashley's parents argue that they are justified in removing
Ashley's breasts and uterus because she has no need for them since she
will never give birth and will never breastfeed. According to that line of
reasoning, the parents would also be justified in amputating Ashley's legs.
because Ashlex xxill nexver be able to xxalk. Presumably. it is Inot likely that
Ashley 's parents xvould consider ordering such a course of action.
Pcrlhaps Ashley's parents are more at ease requesting Ashley's
by steirectomy rather than requesting amputation because society generally
accepts by sterectomies. as they arc commonly peitormed, and aic elected
xvoluntaiily. \mputation. on the other hand, is frequcntlx xviewxed as a last
resort wxhen all other treatment options fail. anld xveiry fexx if any indiv iduals
xxould xvoluntarily haxve their limbs amputated. In light of the parents'
reasoning for the procedures, forcing Ashlex to undergo a by steirectomx,
breast bud remoxval, and growxth attenuation therapy is no different from
requesting that her limbs be amputated to keep her small.
Given the treatment's "enormous potential for abuse,"" hospital ethics
committees should seriously consider whether to allow such treatment and
if deemed permissible, must ensure that adequate procedural safeguards are
in place to protect patients.
X AN -A 1LY IS IS
Whether Ashley's parents made the right or wrong decision regarding their
daughter's health remains unclear. IThe fact that their decision strikes some
members of society as repulsive does not necessarily mean that courts
should prohibit it.91 Furthermore, it is possible that courts should not take an
active involvement in the issue and society should be left to judge whether
it is appropriate. As two doctors posit, "[i f high-dose estrogen treatment is
on the right track, the collective community response will bestow general
approval on growth attenuation; if not, the criticism may suffice to proscribe
this mode of treatment."92
Even though courts traditionally afford strong deference to parents'
rights to make medical decisions tor their children, a court would likely
decide that Ashley's treatment is legally and morally unacceptable. First,
a hy-sterectomy is akin to sterilization-due to the procedure, Ashley will
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involuntary sterilization is that "the individual is . ..likely to engage in
sexual actixvity at the piresenlt or in the near future under circumstances
likely to result in pregnancy."9 In their blog, Ashley's parents imnply that
the only wxay Ashley xwill become pregnant is if she is abused. Due to her
mental condition, she is not likely to cngaoc in sexual actixvity on her own.
T herefore, Ashley's condition might represent an exception to the Hmayes
stanxdard because her mental condition could not allowx her to consciously
choose to engage in sexual actixvity.
Since Ashley 's treatment affects her ability to procreate, this chosen course
of action may also inmplicate a constitutional issue. The right to procreate is
a fundamental right protected by the United States Constitution.)4 Whether
an indiv idual camn assert the protection for the right to procreate if lhe or she
is lcgally incapable of exercising it remains questionable. Frromn a strictly
abstract legal perspective. Asley could be coinsidered sterile, there is ino
xxay tor hci to legally consent to sexual inteicourse due to her diminished
mental capacity. ITherefore, she could not become piegnant wxithout
haxving been abused. One could argue. theictoie. that although Ashley has
the same '"basic cixil right" to procreate that other indixiduals haxe, she
cannot exercise it because she is incapable of cxver xvoluntairily or legally
consenting. Her parents then could argue that the hy sterectomx xwould
not prevent Ashley from exercising an otherwise exercisable right. Net,
this would raise another slippery slope argument and could run the risk
of becoming over-exclusive in practice. For example,
the circumstances ol people sentenced to life in prison
without the possibility of parole prevent the prisoners
from being able to exercise an otherwise exercisable
right, namely: the right to procreate. Ashley has the
right to procreate, but is prevented from exercising
it because of her mental capacity. Prisoners have
the right to procreate, but lack the ability to exercise
that right. This argument would justify such persons
being forcibly sterilized-something the law does not
pennit.9
One might question whether Ashley's parents would be
allowed to exercise Ashley's right to procreate on her
behalf and would be allowed to artificially inseminate
Ashley once she was older so that she could bear a
child. Assume that Ashley were an only child, her
parents could not have any more children, and she was
likely to die fairly young albeit past an appropriate
childbearing age. Further, assume that artificially
inseminating Ashley would not harm her in any way,
and that she would only suffer firom the typical pains
associated with pregnancy and childbirth. Individuals
may be more likely to support this medical procedure
than the procedures that have already been performed
on Ashley.
T-his would be especially true if society were to use
a substituted judgment analysis to evaluate this
hypothetical situation. Under a substituted judgment
analysis, supporters of the artificial insemination
might argue that, since most women want to become
pregnant and have children, it is likely that if Ashley
were competent., she would choose to do so as well.
The legality of the procedure may turn on whcther
Ashley, in fact, has a constitutionally protected right
to procreate. And, it would further depend on whether,
given her legal status as an individual with diminished
capacity, she could exercise this right, or others could
exercise it for her.
Even if Ashley does not have a constitutionally
protected right to procreate so as to prevent her parents
from authorizino her insvoluntary hy stercctomy, there
may be other less invasiv e alternativ es. Another
factor addressed in Hayes wsas vshether "all less
drastic contraceptisve methods . .. hasve been prosved
unw orkable or inapplicable."' Here, Ashley's
parents hasve not shownav whs othcr, less insvasiv e and
irresversible contraceptisve incasures that do not result
in stcrilization wvould he inadcquatc. They profcss that
tbc sole purpose of the by sterectomy is to presvent her
from expcriencing the pains associatcd with puberty.
rather than sterilizing her, which is purely an incidental
benefit.
Even if a court declines to extend the reasoning in Hayes
to Ashley 's other procedures, a court would likely err on
the side of requiring less invasive measures in an effort
to reduce the potential harm to Ashley in the face of such
substantial uncertainty. For example, while large breasts
may make Ashley uncomfortable in certain chair straps,
it is possible that Ashley's parents could find chair straps
that are "more suitable for a larger breast size."
Furthermore, while fear of cancer and fibrocystic
growths may be reasonable, especially where there
is a family history, a court would likely find that this
concern is too speculative to require such invasive
treatment before it is medically necessary. Given her
family history, doctors could simply monitor Ashley's
breasts with regular checkups, as they do with other
women with a higher risk for developing cancer or
fibrocystic growths.
Finally, her parents' argument that large breasts would
"sexualize" Ashley, making her more prone to abuse, is
unpersuasive; it is equally as likely that "someone might
sexually abuse Ashley whether she has breasts or not."98
Ashley's parents argue that if she were to be abused, her
hysterectomy would prevent her from getting pregnant.
Arguably, an abortion in response to a pregnancy
would be less invasive to Ashles than a pre-emptive
hysterectomy. Because none of these treatments will
actually prevent or reduce the likelihood that Ashley vwill
be abused, a court should find that they are too extreme
given the conditions thes seek to address.
Should the treatment pass legal muster, it does not
mean that the treatment is morally sound. Ashley's case
raises significant moral implications. For example.,
this treatment has significant implications regarding
the autonoms of a child with a disability. If, following
Singer's logic, humans only have value based on their
ability to comprehend their own value or by their affect
on others, parents of children who cannot comprehend
their own value may be allowed to do a variety of
unconscionable things to their children. While Gunther
and Diekema advise that "[gjrowth attenuation should
be considered only after careful consideration of the
risks and benefits to each patient on an indiv idual
basis,9 O Xplicit standards and ciiteria vsould need to
be desveloped to ensuie patient piotection. T he factor
of "consvenicnce" may subconsciousls slip into the
cquntion. Whilc such conv enience inns disguise itself
as a benefit in terms of enabling potentially berter caire,
wvithout clear restraints it runs the risk of justifying such
bcbasvior as the amnputation and mutilation of children
to creatc more productisve beggars. While consvenicnce
may enable onc family to take better care of a child.
convenience for another family may result in parental
laziness and neglect of the child.
Even if one agrees with the extrapolation based on
Singer's philosophy that, without self awareness,
humans have no inherent value except as to what
they bring to others, this treatment is still morally
questionable because of the substantial uncertainty
involved. While Ashley's parents, doctors, and media
reports describe Ashley as having the mental capacity
of an infant, this description is not entirely accurate.
The Supreme Court has held that the "'mental
age' concept, irrespective of its intuitive appeal, is
problematic in several respects."" Relying on an
amicus brief submitted by the American Association
on Intellectual and Individual Disabilities, the
Court found that "Itihe 'mental age' concept may
underestimate the life experiences of retarded adults,
while it may overestimate the ability of retarded adults
to use logic and foresight to solve problems."o
Accordingly, Ashley is not an infant; she is a nine-
year-old with severe cognitive disabilities. Ashley
appears to be aware of her environment and interacts.,
in her own way, with her family members." Ashley
even interacts with others outside of her family, as she
attends a school for special needs children."
Therefore, given how little is known about what
Ashley is thinking or feeling, a court may be premature
in allowing for such invasive procedures without fully
comprehending the potentially profound side effects
Ashley's treatment could have on her emotional well-
being. The treatment will significantly alter Ashley's
appearance vis-a-vis how it would otherwise develop.
Sobsey states that "the long-term effects of high-dose
estrogen applied to a six-year-old child are likely to
result in highly atypical physical appearance that is at
least as dramatic as simple amputation. TFhe effects are
likely to include extremely short stature, infantilization
of long-bone body proportions...acne, and ironically,
increased body tat and weight gain."104 As Ashley
matures and sees her classmates around her mature, it is
possible that she will notice, and somehow internalize.
the difference between her appearance and those of her
elassmates. In oirder to respeet Ashley 's autonomy and
aet in her best interest, more information is needed as
to the potential emotional effeets sueh treatment eould
hasve on a ehild in Ashley's eondition.
Courts should also aeknoxxledge that proeedures
deemed to be legal today eould be pereeixved as
shoeking to one's eonseienee tomorrows. This has
been espeeiallx true of soeietsy's historieal treatment
of persons wxith disabilities. For example, the eugenie
movement of the early 1900s eneouraoed soeiety to
take action to prevent the production of children with
mental retardation. "Defective" infants were allowed
to die, certain couples were prevented from marrying,
and more horrifically. many persons with mental
retardation were sterilized against their will.io1 Perhaps
most troubling, the Supreme Court decision in Buck
i. Bell,"6 which upheld such involuntary sterilization
laws, technically remains on the books as good law.
If "Ashley's treatment" becomes a nationally accepted
method of treating children with profound mental and
physical disabilities, then hospitals must be sure to
develop thorough guidelines to ensure that the treatment
is performed only when it is, in fact, in the child's
best interest. In the event that judicial intervention is
necessary, courts should appoint guardians on behalf
of children who are possible recipients of the treatment
to ensure their moral and legal rights are protected.
Treatment should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis
by hospital's ethics committees. Further, a court order
should be required where the hospital questions the
ethical nature of the procedure.
VL CN uSION
Persons with disabilities have a long history of
suffering abuse in this country. Whatever irreversible
measures are taken in the name of "treatment"' must
be scrutinized with extreme care. Third parties to this
debate, as a whole, have not been privy to or personally
involved in the individualized and highly personal
decisions that Ashley's parents have grappled with in
recent years. Ihe medical community and laypersons,
alike, should be wary of endorsing these treatment
options without more information and research. While
Ashley's parents likely are well-intentioned, good
intentions do not always provide for the best interests
of the child.
Ashley's parents say that they "did not pursue this
treatment withithe intention of prolonging Ashley's care
at home... [and that they] would never turn the care of
Ashley over to strangers even if she had grown tall and
heavy."' They profess that, even if Ashley weighed
300 pounds, they would find a way to continue caring
for her in their home.ios If that is the case, then one must
xxonder xxhy the family has insisted on performing the
treatment at all. Conceivably, the family could resort
to other, less intrusisve measures to enable Ashley to be
mecluded in more lam ils events.
Esven though seientific progress should not stop
beeause of uncertainty, at the least, such uneertainty
should lead members of soeiety to pause and reflect.
\We are not sure xxhat kind of treatment wxould be in
Ashley 's best interests. We do not knows xxhat she is
thinking or feeling. WAe do. bossesver, knosw that the kind
of treatment her parents have prescribed for Ashley is
irreversible and could have profound psychological
and physiological side ettects. Perhaps science should
focus on better understanding the brain and inner-workings of a child with
severe cognitive disabilities. Only then will society really be able to know
what will be in such a child's best interest.
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